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NOTE
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES





The United States Constitution protects every citizen's religious free-
dom and personal privacy.2 Generally, one or both of these rights have
U. S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id. This part of the first amendment has two
clauses: the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUrIONAL LAW § 17.1, at 1031 (3d ed. 1986). The first amendment has been
extended to the states. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-18 (1947) (establishment
clause held applicable to states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301-03 (1940) (free
exercise clause held applicable to states).
The free exercise clause prohibits government from proscribing religious beliefs. See
Pierce v. Society Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (statute requiring children to attend only
public schools considered undue restriction on freedom of both parents and children); see
also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra § 17.6, at 1067.
An individual may seek exemption from a government requirement under the free exer-
cise clause. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 1242 (2d ed. 1988). The
claimant must show that he has a sincerely held religious belief and that this belief is bur-
dened by state requirements. Id.; see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696 (1986) (court
accepted sincerity of claimants' assertion that use of social security number in daughter's
name would injure her "spirit"). But see Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981)
(some beliefs may be "so bizarre, so clearly non-religious in motivation as not to be entitled
to protection under Free Exercise Clause").
The freedom of religion guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions is not unlim-
ited. See McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah's Wit-
nesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 997, 998 (1987). Although the freedom to
believe is absolute, the freedom to act on those beliefs may be regulated for the protection
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been involved when justifying an individual's refusal of life-saving medi-
cal treatment.8 The right to refuse this treatment, otherwise known as
of society. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (religious liberty does not
allow privilege to incite others to bodily attack); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39
(1905) (state may enact compulsory vaccination law); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 167 (1878) (religious belief in polygamy will not justify actions of bigamist); Lawson v.
Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 440, 164 S.W.2d 972, 974 (1942) (state may prohibit religious
rite which requires snake-handling).
" See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (court balanced compelling governmental interests
against woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and acknowledged constitutional protec-
tion for fundamental right of privacy). Although the Constitution does not expressly provide
for a right of privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a constitutional pro-
tection for certain "zones of privacy." Id. at 152.
The Court has stated that this right of privacy arose from the first amendment, the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights, and the fourteenth amendment. See Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 452-55 (1972) (upheld right to distribute contraceptives to unmarried per-
sons); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (person could not be punished for
private possession of obscene material); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965)
(upholding married couple's right to use contraceptives). The right of privacy is a funda-
mental right which includes various forms of choice in matters relating to the individual's
personal life. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 1, § 11.7, at 371. Funda-
mental rights are to be given strict forms of constitutional protection. Id. at 367.
For the development of the right of privacy at common law, see Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1890). The most carefully guarded and sacred right at common
law is "the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law." Id.
The right of privacy is not absolute-at some point the state's interests in protecting
health, medical standards, and prenatal life predominate. See Wade, 410 U.S. at 146-67;
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29-36.
' See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972) (patient refused lifesaving blood transfu-
sions based on religious belief); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 M. 2d 361, 363, 205 N.E.2d 435,
436-37 (1965) (patient repeatedly informed doctor of religious convictions precluding her
from receiving blood transfusions to save her life); Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 337,
353 A.2d 634, 635 (1976) (refusal of blood transfusions on religious grounds). The right to
refuse medical treatment always involves an individual's right of privacy, therefore when a
right to refuse is based on religious grounds both rights are asserted. See id.
There are many cases based strictly on the right to privacy. See, e.g., Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 134, 482 A.2d 713, 717-18, 720 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1984) (semi-comatose patient asserting right of privacy permitted to forego life-
sustaining treatment); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921,
926 (Fla. 1984) (terminally ill incompetent person, in permanent vegetative state with no
reasonable prospect of regaining cognitive brain function, sustained only through use of ex-
traordinary life-sustaining treatment, can have treatment terminated, under "doctrine of
substituted judgment" by close family member based on terminally ill individual's right of
privacy); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 8-9, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814-15
(Ct. C.P. 1980) (constitutional right to privacy guarantees right of terminally ill and perma-
nently semi-comatose person to decide his or her own treatment).
Most individuals asserting only their right of privacy are incurably ill patients undergo-
ing extraordinary life-sustaining medical treatment. See, e.g., Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 812,
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"the right to die,"4 has engendered continuous litigation and has raised
profound legal and moral questions.' A person asserting a right to die is
in direct conflict with competing state interests'-specifically, the preser-
vation of life, protecting third parties, preventing suicide, and maintain-
ing the medical profession's ethical integrity.8 Presently, a balancing test
426 N.E.2d at 812.
When a person is refusing lifesaving medical treatment he is generally asserting his
right of religious freedom because the type of treatment is against a tenet of his religion.
See, e.g., Hamilton, 277 Md. at 337, 353 A.2d at 635.
Courts sometimes distinguish between lifesaving and life-sustaining treatment when de-
ciding whether a person has a right to die. See A. MmIsEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 4.11, at 92-93
(1988). Courts are more willing to uphold a person's right to die as the patient's prognosis
dims. See id. at 93-94. If treatment can save a person's life, courts are more willing to deny
the patient's right to die. Id.; see, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J.
576, 579-80, 279 A.2d 670, 674 (1971) (court appointed guardian to consent to blood transfu-
sion for twenty-two-year-old female, where hospital and medical personnel believed patient
would die without it). But see St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (non-terminal patient allowed to refuse blood transfusion because of religious
beliefs).
' See 1 NEw Topic SERv. AM. JUR. 2D, Right to Die; Wrongful Life § 7 (1979). "Even though
it is misleading to characterize as a 'right to die' the right to determine what shall be done
with ones body, the right to acquiesce in an imminent and inevitable death ... has often
been referred to in those terms." Id.
6 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
' See Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 216, 267 N.Y.S.2d
450, 451 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1965) (court ordered blood transfusion for mother of six chil-
dren who refused to give consent, but was not opposed to receiving transfusion). Justice
Markowitz stated, "Never before had my judicial robe weighed so heavily on my shoulders."
Id.; P. RIGA, RIGHT TO DIE OR RIGHT TO LivE vii (1981) (decision of whether or not to allow
individual right to die further complicated "by the almost limitless circumstances surround-
ing each case"); see also Note, The Dying Patient: A Qualified Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment, 7 J. FAM. L. 644, 644 (1967) ("bizarre issue" of whether competent adult has
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment is arising with increasing frequency); Comment,
Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Jackson: A Recurring Dilemma for Health Care Providers in the
Treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses, 46 MD. L. REv. 514, 514 (1987) [hereinafter Mercy Hos-
pital] (legal problems which arise when Jehovah's Witness refuses lifesaving blood transfu-
sion are among most difficult to resolve ethically).
" See Heston, 58 N.J. at 580, 279 A.2d at 674 (when individual invokes right to refuse life-
saving treatment there is clash with state interest in preserving life and efforts to maintain
medical and ethical integrity); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421, 425, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. Super. Ct.) (pregnant individual asserting right to refuse
lifesaving treatment conflicted with state's interest in preserving life and protecting inno-
cent third parties), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
8 See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 732-36, 370
N.E.2d 417, 425-27 (1977). The court surveyed the previous cases involving an individual's
right to refuse medical treatment and developed the list of four countervailing state inter-
ests. Id.
Other courts have adopted the approach of looking at the four state interests in conflict
with one's right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666,
668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 359 (Fla. 1980); Brophy v.
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is employed to resolve this conflict.9 Courts have not yet developed a uni-
form approach in applying this test, especially when an individual refuses
treatment because the medical procedure in question would violate a ba-
sic religious tenet.10
This Note will discuss how the judiciary has applied the balancing
test in determining whether a Jehovah's Witness may refuse a blood
transfusion. Furthermore, this Note will examine the inherent conflict in
balancing state interests against an individual's right of self-determina-
tion. Specifically, the weight and degree of sensitivity to be given the
state's interest in preserving life and protecting third parties will be ana-
lyzed. Finally, this Note will suggest how to equitably apply the balancing
analysis in future cases.
LANDMARK CASE LAW ON REFUSAL OF BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS BY JEHOVAH'S
WITNESSES
In determining whether an individual may refuse medical treatment,
courts have arrived at varying and occasionally inconsistent results."1
This is due to the absence of clearly formulated legislation and the virtu-
ally unlimited factual situations that have arisen."9 Ordinarily, however,
New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 427, 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (1986); Eichner v.
Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 465-66, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 543-44 (2d Dep't 1980). See generally A.
MEisL, supra note 3, § 4.12, at 99 n.174.
' See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 736, 370 N.E.2d at 427. There must be a proper balancing of
the four applicable state interests against individual interests in an effort to determine
which right should prevail. See id. The patient's right to decline treatment may be overrid-
den only if the state's interests are sufficiently compelling. See In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156,
158-59 (Del. Ch. 1980); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 8-9, 426
N.E.2d 809, 814-15 (Ct. C.P. 1980). But see In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 369, 205
N.E.2d 435, 439-42 (1965) (applying "clear and present danger" test rather than "compel-
ling state interest" test in balancing rights of patient against those of state). In Brooks, the
court determined that absent any "clear and present danger to society" the state could not
force a blood transfusion upon a Jehovah's Witness. Id. at 369, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
"0 See Moore, Their Life Is in the Blood: Jehovah's Witness, Blood Transfusions and the
Courts, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 281, 298-302 (1983). No uniform approach has emerged from the
case-by-case balancing test. Id. at 301-02. "The degree of 'compellingness' will... vary from
court to court." Id. at 302. Compare John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J.
576, 580, 279 A.2d 670, 674 (1971) (state's interest in preserving life prevailed over a pa-
tient's right to refuse treatment) with In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374-75 (D.C. 1972) (indi-
vidual's freedom of choice outweighs state interest in preservation of life).
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
, To date, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have "living will" statutes. See
Smith, All is Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or
Merely Enlightened Self-Determination, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 275, 329 n.389 (1989) (list of
states with living will statutes). Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have also
passed "natural death" acts. Id. at 329-30 n.392 (list of states with natural death acts).
Living will and natural death legislation have not resolved the matter-frequently, impor-
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when the patient is competent, childless, and not pregnant, the right of
self-determination outweighs the countervailing state interests and the
individual is generally permitted to reject medical treatment even at the
risk of certain death.1" A number of cases in which a right has been as-
serted to refuse lifesaving medical treatment have involved refusal of
blood transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses. '
tant legislative terms are unclear and subject to misinterpretation. See, e.g., Horan, The
Right to Die: Legislative and Judicial Developments, 13 FORUM 488, 491-94 (1978) (rather
than clarifying when life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn, California's natural death
act has complicated matters for medical profession). Commentators criticizing one state's
legislation will praise another state's "clearer" statute. See Comment, Discontinuing Treat-
ment of Comatose Patients Who Have Not Executed Living Wills, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 61,
86-96 (1985) (problems arising from California's natural death statute would be better re-
solved via legislation following North Carolina's natural death act). However, the North
Carolina statute has its own question marks. See Comment, North Carolina's Natural
Death Act: Confronting Death With Dignity, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 771, 786-87 (1978)
(North Carolina act unclear regarding present intent of patient who executed past "living
will").
Even the most carefully drawn legislation would leave some issues unresolved-after all,
the courts have confronted widely varying fact situations with the present balancing test.
See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1135-36, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299-
300 (1986) (young single woman, quadriplegic and bedridden for life wished to "starve her-
self to death"); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (seventy-
three-year-old man terminally ill with two-year life expectancy), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980); Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d at 364, 205 N.E.2d at 436 (Jehovah's Witness, mother of two adult
children); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 18, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (1976) (twenty-two-year-old single
woman in persistent vegetative state), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977); Fosmire v.
Nicoleau, 144 A.D.2d 8, 11, 536 N.Y.S.2d 492, 493-94 (2d Dep't 1989) (thirty-six-year-old
Jehovah's Witness refused blood transfusion for hemorrhaging after giving birth), afl'd, 75
N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990).
"1 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 353, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985) (competent adult generally
has right to decline to have any medical treatment initiated or continued); see also Satz,
362 So. 2d at 163 (competent patient has right to privacy and may refuse life prolonging
treatment after prognosis of an agonizing terminal illness); Schloendorff v. Society of the
N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 92 (1914) (operation to remove tumor after
patient had specifically forbidden it was an assault). See generally Byrn, Compulsory Life-
saving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1975) (discussing cases
that premised right to die on right of privacy enunciated by Supreme Court in abortion-
related decisions).
14 A recent case illustrates the scope of the problem. In Munn v. Southern Health Plan,
Inc., 719 F. Supp. 525 (1989), the defendant attempted to assert the defenses of avoidable
consequences and assumption of the risk where he negligently caused a car accident by
attempting to overtake plaintiff's car in the fog. Id. at 525. Plaintiff and his wife were Jeho-
vah's Witnesses and the wife, who was seriously injured, refused to undergo a blood transfu-
sion. Id. She subsequently died and defendant claimed it was not his negligence that caused
her death but her own negligence in refusing the blood transfusion. Id. at 525-26; see also
Moore, supra note 10, at 281. Jehovah's Witnesses believe accepting blood into the body is a
grave sin against the Lord. See Deuteronomy 12:23-25 (King James).
Only be sure that thou eat not the blood for the blood is life; and thou mayest not eat
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Recently, in Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons,' 5 the Su-
preme Court of Florida held that there was no compelling state interest
which would require a Jehovah's Witness to submit to a blood transfusion
which may be necessary to sustain her life."e In Wons, Mrs. Norma Wons
checked herself into Jackson Memorial Hospital with a condition known
as dysfunctional uterine bleeding.17 Doctors immediately advised Mrs.
Wons that without a blood transfusion she would probably die." Mrs.
Wons, a practicing Jehovah's Witness and mother of two, declined the
treatment based on her religious beliefs. 9 Immediately thereafter, the
Health Trust petitioned the circuit court, attempting to force Mrs. Wons
to submit to the blood transfusion.2 0 At the hearing, Norma Wons' hus-
band testified that he fully supported her decision to refuse treatment.2 "
Furthermore, he stated that if Mrs. Wons were to die, the two children
would be cared for by him and Mrs. Wons' supportive family.2 Notwith-
standing, the court ordered the transfusion, which was performed while
Mrs. Wons was unconscious.2 '
Upon awakening, Mrs. Wons immediately appealed the order. The
order was reversed by the district court24 which held that the state's in-
the life with the flesh. Thou shalt not eat it; thou shalt pour it upon the earth as
water. Thou shalt not eat it; that it may go well with thee, and with thy children after
thee, when thou shalt do that, which is right in the sight of the Lord.
Id.; see also JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND THE QUESTION OF BLOOD, WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND
TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA 17 (1977).
"5 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989), afJ'g 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
16 Id. at 98.
17 Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679, 681. Although the bleeding
had stopped, it was determined she had lost over ninety percent of her available red blood
cells. Id.
I /d.
', Id. The doctor told the court that although Mrs. Wons was drowsy and tired due to
anemia, she was mentally competent. Mrs. Wons stated, "[n]o, I refuse based on my reli-
gious beliefs, the law of Jehovah, which says you will not accept a blood transfusion," fur-
thermore, she continued, "I will pull through." Id.
'0 Id. at 680.
" Id. Mr. Wons testified that pursuant to his religious beliefs, he too would refuse a blood
transfusion. Id. He also stated he was the sole financial support of the family. Id.
21 Id. at 681. As a result of her illness, Mrs. Wons had been confined to bed for several
weeks. Id. Mrs. Wons' mother had been caring for the children while Mr. Wons was at work.
Id.
11 Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97. Trial judge Edmund W. Newbold of the Dade County Circuit
Court based his decision on his belief that the children had a right to be raised in a two-
parent home. Wons, 500 So. 2d at 683. Although recognizing a competent adult's constitu-
tional right to refuse treatment, Judge Newbold reasoned that the children's right to a
mother and two-parent home was compelling enough to override Mrs. Wons' rights of free
religious exercise and privacy. Id. However, he urged an appeal of the decision in recogni-
tion that the issue was extremely controversial and legally complex. Id.
3' Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97. The court promptly agreed that the issue presented was of great
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terests could not override Mrs. Wons' constitutional rights to religious
freedom and privacy." Believing the issue to be one of great public im-
portance, the court certified it to the Supreme Court of Florida.' The
supreme court affirmed the district court, holding that Mrs. Wons could
refuse the lifesaving blood transfusion.
Writing for the court, Justice Kogan indicated that the individual's
right to refuse treatment must be determined by delicately balancing the
rights of the state against those of the individual2 8 using the four criteria
set forth in Satz v. Perlmutter.2 9 The court reasoned that the state's in-
terest in preserving a two-parent home for the minor children was not
sufficiently compelling to outweigh Mrs. Wons' right to privacy and reli-
gious freedom.3 0 Therefore, the court concluded that Mrs. Wons could re-
importance. Wons, 500 So. 2d at 684. The court also recognized that the issue was not
unique and would occur again. Id. In consideration of these facts, and the fact that Mrs.
Wons' condition was a recurring one where additional blood transfusions may become neces-
sary, the court of appeals immediately agreed the appeal was not rendered moot. Id.
" Id. at 688. The court stated:
Viewed in the abstract and without the benefit of our constitutional heritage, the
rights of the individual in this area of law may seem to some rather paltry when
weighed against the interests of society as a whole . . . On the contrary, the courts
have given great deference to the privacy and religious freedom rights involved in the
subject balance-and have required only the most compelling of societal interests to
override such rights.
Id. at 687. The court stated that three of the four societal interests which could override the
patient's rights were absent-the state's interest in preserving life, maintaining the ethical
integrity of the medical profession, and preventing suicide. Id. In the court's view, the pro-
tection of third parties, namely the minor children, was the only issue to be resolved. Id. at
688. Since the children had a surviving father and a supportive family to provide financial
support, they would not become wards of the state, therefore, there is no abandonment. Id.
11 Id. at 680.
"7 Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97.
' Id.
2 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). The Perlmut-
ter court adopted the balancing test set forth in Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 735, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). In Perlmutter, the issue
was whether a competent adult patient, with no minor children, suffering from a terminal
illness, has the constitutional right to refuse extraordinary medical treatment. Perlmutter,
362 So. 2d at 162. The court immediately recognized the state's strong interest in the preser-
vation of life; however, it made a distinction between the patient who can be cured and the
patient who is terminal. Id. The Perlmutter court found the patient's situation wretched
and continuation of his life temporary and totally artificial. Id. Therefore, there was no
compelling state interest which could override the patient's wishes. Id. Mr. Perlnutter had
no minor children, so the state's interest in protecting third parties was not a factor in the
decision. Id. It was clear that Mr. Perlmutter wished to live, but not artificially. Id. Conse-
quently, the court found that the state's interest in prevention of suicide is not an issue. Id.
at 163. Finally, the court reasoned that allowing a suffering, terminal patient to refuse con-
tinued treatment is consistent with modern medical mores. Id.
" Wons, 541 So. 2d at 98. The court adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals. Id.; see
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fuse consent to any future blood transfusion. 31
Chief Justice Ehrlich concurred with the majority opinion, asserting
that the primary interest in the case was the protection of the minor chil-
dren, which has its basis in the doctrine of parens patriae8 , The chief
justice indicated that, should Mrs. Wons die, the children would be cared
for by the surviving family members, and, therefore, would not be aban-
doned.88 The concurring opinion continued by stating that although the
state's interest in the preservation of life is strong, it cannot override Mrs.
Wons' personal interest in directing the course of her life. 4 Chief Justice
Ehrlich reasoned that the costs of preserving Mrs. Wons' life were too
high, as she would be forced to commit a great sin against her religion
which would make returning to a normal life impossible.88 The concur-
rence concluded that a truly compelling state interest was absent, hence,
the court must protect Mrs. Wons' right to make her own choice.8"
Justice Overton, in a vigorous dissent, argued that reliance on Satz v.
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
'l Wons, 541 So. 2d at 98.
Id. "Parens patriae, literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role of
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1003 (5th Ed. 1979). See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (parental control
over child subject to state and may be regulated by legislation or judicial action); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (state, as parens patriae, has power to limit paren-
tal freedom and authority in areas that affect child's welfare); Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal.
App. 2d 636, 640, 334 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1959) (parents responsible to state for their child's
well-being).
. The parens patriae doctrine can be traced to Roman law. See Keiter, Privacy, Chil-
dren, and Their Parents: Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66
MINN. L. REv. 459, 498-01 (1982) (predicate for parens patriae state intervention is presump-
tion that certain classes of citizens are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and lack abil-
ity to care for themselves); Developments in the Law, The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1199 (1980) (acting under its parens patriae power, state may pursue
ends that would be impermissible under police power).
31 Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring). The chief justice analogized the situa-
tion in Wons as nearly identical to that in In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972). The
Osborne court allowed a mentally competent male Jehovah's Witness to refuse a blood
transfusion. Id. at 376. The court acknowledged the presence of two minor children, how-
ever, the close family relationship that existed was taken as evidence the children would be
cared for sufficiently. Id. at 375.
" Wons, 541 So. 2d at 100 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 101 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Ehrlich reasoned that Mrs. Wons
would be unable to live with her sin or the knowledge she may have to submit to another
blood transfusion in the future. Id. at 100 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring). He recognized that
"[the] cost must be looked at from the patient's point of view," and questioned the dissent's
simplified statement that Mrs. Wons could return to a normal life. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J.,
concurring).
36 Id. at 102 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
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Perlmutter was misguided. 7 Furthermore, the state's interests in preserv-
ing life and preventing abandonment of the minor children were clearly
compelling enough to warrant the necessary blood transfusion.38 The dis-
sent concluded, therefore, that the state should prevent the totally unnec-
essary death of Mrs. Wons and protect the innocent children from
abandonment."
In an earlier case, Application of the President and Directors of Ge-
orgetown College, Inc.,"° the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict Court of Columbia decided that the state's interests in the preserva-
tion of life and protection of third parties overcame both a patient's right
to privacy and her freedom to exercise her religious beliefs."1 The patient,
Mrs. Jones, was a Jehovah's Witness and mother of a seven-month-old
infant.'2 She had lost two-thirds of her blood supply due to a ruptured
ulcer." As a consequence of her faith, she refused to consent to a crucial
blood transfusion." The hospital immediately sought an injunction in a
district court, which was denied." The hospital then initiated an appeal
to Judge J. Skelly Wright. 6 Judge Wright, recognizing the immediacy of
the situation, visited the patient at the hospital. 17 Subsequently, Judge
Wright granted the hospital a court order authorizing the transfusion."
In reaching his decision, Judge Wright examined the state's interest
in protecting minor children and reasoned that the mother had a duty to
society to care for her child, therefore, the state will not permit the
Id. at 102 (Overton, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.
2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), af'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980), on the facts. Wons, 542
So. 2d at 102 (Overton, J., dissenting). Mr. Perlmutter, Justice Overton noted, was seventy-
three years old and terminally ill, with a life expectancy of two years. Id. at 104 (Overton, J.,
dissenting). Justice Overton contended that the decision unreasonably extends the analysis
contrary to the Perlmutter court's original intention. Id. at 103 (Overton, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the Perlmutter court specifically limited the holding to the facts. Id. (Overton, J.,
dissenting).
"s Justice Overton took judicial notice of the fact that the two children would be denied an
intangible right they had to be raised by two loving parents. Wons, 541 So.2d at 102 (Over-
ton, J., dissenting).
I0 Id.
-0 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
" Id. at 1008.
42 Id. at 1006.
4 Id.
" Id. at 1002.
46 Id. at 1001.
46 Id.
"I Id. at 1006. While at the hospital, Judge Wright spoke to the patient's husband who
reaffirmed his refusal to approve the blood transfusion. Id. He also attempted to communi-
cate with Mrs. Jones. Id. at 1007. Her'only statement was a barely audible, "[a]gainst my
will." Id.
4 Id. at 1007.
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mother to abandon the child.' 9 Judge Wright also addressed the state's
interest in the prevention of suicide." He stated that Mrs. Jones had no
desire to commit suicide, as was evidenced by the fact that she volunta-
rily admitted herself into the hospital."' The opinion concluded by assert-
ing the most "compelling reason" which mandated the unwanted transfu-
sion.5 2 Judge Wright stressed that "a life hung in the balance ... [tihere
was no time for research and reflection."" Action was necessary to "pre-
serve the status quo," so he chose "to act on the side of life.""
In another important case, In re Estate of Brooks,55 the Illinois Su-
preme Court chose to uphold a patient's right to refuse an essential blood
transfusion to treat a peptic ulcer."' The patient was a wife and the
mother of adult children. 57 Mrs. Brooks and her husband signed a docu-
ment releasing the hospital from all civil liability that might result from
not administering the blood transfusion." Nevertheless, Mrs. Brooks'
doctor and several attorneys for the state petitioned the probate court to
appoint a guardian for Mrs. Brooks and to authorize the guardian to con-
sent to the blood transfusion." Thereafter, the guardian was appointed
and consented to the procedure.0 After the transfusion, Mrs. Brooks ap-
pealed the probate court decision."'
In upholding Mrs. Brooks' right to refuse, the court reasoned that
the patient's choice to refuse the blood transfusion posed no "overriding
danger to society,"' and, therefore, precluded judicial intervention."3 To
" Id. at 1008. Judge Wright reasoned that since the state acting as parens patriae could
prohibit a mother from abandoning her child, "so it should not allow this most ultimate of
voluntary abandonments." Id. at 1008. Therefore, the state's interest in preserving the
mother's life is indisputable. Id.
Id. at 1009.
81 Id. "The Gordian knot of this suicide question may be cut by the simple fact that Mrs.
Jones did not want to die." Id. Simply stated, "Mrs. Jones wanted to live." Id. Potential
death was incident to her religious beliefs, it was not sought nor desired. Id.
52 Id.
53Id.
" Id. at 1010.
32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
Id. at 363, 205 N.E.2d at 436.
" Id. The court suggested that if minor children had been involved its decision may have
been different since the state has an interest in seeing that the children do not become
wards of the state. Id. at 366-70, 205 N.E.2d at 440-442.
- Id. at 364, 205 N.E.2d at 437.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 363, 205 N.E.2d at 436.
62 Id. at 369-70, 205 N.E.2d at 442. The court reasoned:
[The] First Amendment .. . protects the absolute right of every individual to
freedom in his religious belief and the exercise thereof, subject only to the qualifica-
tion that the exercise thereof may properly be limited by governmental action where
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decide otherwise, the court concluded, would violate the patient's right to
religious freedom." '
The courts of New York have also wrestled with the complex issues
that arise when an individual refuses a crucial blood transfusion on reli-
gious grounds.6 6 New York courts have recognized that a competent pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute and may be su-
perseded by a compelling state interest.6 Recently, in Fosmire v.
Nicoleau,7 the leading New York case in this area, the appellate division
held that the supreme court had erroneously authorized a blood transfu-
sion on a patient who had just given birth by cesarean section." The
court stated that the patient's constitutional right to due process was vio-
lated by the court's failure to fully ascertain "the patient's state of mind
and wishes" before authorizing the transfusion which was clearly against
the patient's religious beliefs and personal convictions.6 9
In anticipation of similar cases occurring in the future, the court
stated that an individual's right to refuse treatment was not unqualified.7 0
such exercise endangers, clearly and presently, the public health, welfare or morals.
Id. at 368, 205 N.E.2d at 441.
63 Id. at 369-70, 205 N.E.2d at 442. The court stated that it may consider the individual's
beliefs "unwise, foolish or ridiculous," but could not "decide what course of action is best for
a particular individual .. " Id.
" Id. In a later case, a federal court interpreting Illinois law stated that the true test to
determine whether a state may impose restrictions on religious freedom is "an ad hoc bal-
ancing test which examines the facts of each particular case, focusing upon the interests of
the state and its citizens." See Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Ill.
1972). This seems to indicate that the "overriding present danger" test is no longer applica-
ble in favor of the balancing analysis employed by a majority of the courts.
" See In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty.
1976) (upholding non-pregnant, childless, competent adult's decision to refuse blood trans-
fusion based on religious principles); Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 49
Misc. 2d 215, 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1965) (court ordered a blood
transfusion to mother of six against religious convictions); Erikson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d
27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1962) (upholding adult male's decision to
refuse blood transfusion).
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
67 144 A.D.2d 8, 536 N.Y.S.2d 492 (2d Dep't 1989).
Id. at 10-11, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
69 See id. at 12, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95. Brookhaven Memorial Hospital applied for a court
order authorizing the administration of a blood transfusion to Mrs. Nicoleau after she had
refused such treatment. Id. at 11, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 494. Without conducting a hearing or
contacting the Nicoleau family or their representatives, the supreme court issued an ex
parte order authorizing the hospital to administer the blood transfusion. Id. The court rea-
soned that since the rights involved were so important, the court should not have taken any
action until the patient or her legal representatives had an opportunity to be heard. Id. at
12, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
70 See id. at 14, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 495-96. The court stated that even if the individual based
her right to refuse the treatment upon her religious beliefs, state interests could still prevail.
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The court identified the four basic state interests which, if compelling
enough, could override an individual's right to self-determination.71 The
opinion emphasized that in this particular situation non-blood treatment
could have been utilized successfully to preserve the patient's right and
that these avenues of treatment must be explored before considering
blood transfusions.7 2 Even if non-blood treatment was not a viable option,
however, the state's interest in preserving life would not be controlling by
itself.7 ' The Fosmire court stressed that if the patient had not yet given
birth and her unborn child was at risk by her choice to forego treatment,
the state, as parens patriae, could mandate the treatment.74 The most
difficult issue in the balancing process was the state's interest in protect-
ing minor children.7 5 The court stressed that the most crucial factor to be
considered was whether the surviving family members would be finan-
cially able to care for the child.
7 1
However, the court conceded that the best interests of the child
could not be reduced to a "rigid rule to be followed blindly in every case
in which there exists a surviving parent and extended family. '77 Instead,
courts must exercise wide discretion in recognition of the innumerable
fact situations and act on behalf of the child. 78 In any event, the court has
the responsibility to make "the most extensive inquiry possible under the
circumstances" in order to accurately balance a patient's wishes against
the competing state interests. 9
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF LIFE
The majority of commentators agree that the most significant state




73 Id. The court pointed out that this case did not involve a pregnant woman whose refusal
would jeopardize the life of her unborn baby, or a patient who refused to affirmatively con-
sent to treatment but would allow treatment if court ordered. See id. at 15, 536 N.Y.S.2d at
496. Thus, the court seems to suggest that the state's interest in preserving life would pre-
vail if any of these factors were present. See id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 15-16, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97.
70 Id. The court also stated that the surviving family must be willing to provide familial and
emotional support for the child. Id. at 15, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
77 Id. at 16, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
78 Id. The court recognized the sensitivity involved in making determinations in this area;
however, the court stated that it would appear the state interest in protecting minor chil-
dren would be satisfied because there was a concerned and interested surviving parent who
was financially capable of supporting the child. See id.
7' Id.
80 See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 216, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (1987) (state's interest in
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two distinct concepts-preserving the respect for sanctity of all life and
preserving as inherently valuable the life of the individual person.81 Re-
cently, the focus of the state's interest has been on the quality of the
patient's life and the potential for complete recovery.8s It is widely recog-
nized that the state's interest in preserving life erodes and the privacy
rights of the individual are enhanced when an increasing risk of bodily
invasion exists with a minimal likelihood of recovery. 8 Indeed, most of
the refusal-of-treatment cases have involved highly invasive treatments,
such as artificial respiration, dialysis or amputation.8 ' Therefore, there is
preservation of life is most significant of four state interests that may override individual's
right to refuse treatment); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 732, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977) (preservation of life clearly most decisive state
interest). But see St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(state's interest in preserving life compelling but not "unswerving mandate").
Law and society have formulated nearly uniform views on the high value of human life.
See, e.g., In re Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center v. Levitt, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 397,
342 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1973) (court appointed patient's niece as
guardian for purpose of giving consent to lifesaving operation); see also Note, Unauthorized
Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. Rav. 860, 862 (1965) [hereinafter
Note, Unauthorized Rendition] ("[t]he law's traditional view of the sanctity of human life
and the importance of the individual's life to the welfare of society, deny the individual a
right to, in effect, consent to his own death"); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and
the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 IND. L. REv. 386, 400 (1967) [hereinafter Note, Compulsory
Medical Treatment]. Society's interest in the preservation of a single life can be character-
ized in either utilitarian or moral terms. Id. The utilitarian point of view emphasized "the
effect of the individual's death on others in society in terms of grief, shock and despair." Id.
The moral point of view would stress the "sacredness of human life and its spiritual value."
Id.
51 See Matthews, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treat-
ment, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 707, 731 (1987) (discussing conflict between state's interest in pre-
serving patient's life versus individual's right to self-determination).
0' See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (1986)
(court upheld refusal because of patient's subjective view that her life was worthless);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (1986) (state
interest in life doesn't focus on "mere corporal existence," but rather on preserving dignity
of individual patient).
" See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1977). "[Tlhe state interest... weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims." Id.; see also Satz v. Perlmutter,
362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (important distinction between preserving life
when patient is terminal and when patient may recover), af'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In
re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 119, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983) (state's interest weak-
ens with continued treatment on terminal patient).
" See Satz, 362 So. 2d at 161 (terminal patient requesting removal of artificial respirator);
Comm'r of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 256, 399 N.E.2d 452, 453 (1979) (patient
refusing to consent to hemodialysis treatments); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282,
283, 383 A.2d 785, 786 (1978) (patient refusing to allow amputation of gangrenous legs). But
see Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (stating that right to refuse
extends to all treatment); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal.
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an important distinction between prolonging life and preserving life.8 5 It
is generally accepted that a blood transfusion is a non-invasive medical
treatment.86 Additionally, in most instances, if the patient submits to the
lifesaving transfusion, the medical prognosis is extremely favorable and
the individual may return to a qualitatively rich life.87 This Notesuggests
that courts often fail to recognize and adequately consider the patient's
youth, intelligence, and potential for long life. It is therefore suggested
that the state's interest in preserving life is severely mitigated by allowing
such patients to refuse crucial blood transfusions.
In the same context as the aforementioned argument, it can be as-
serted that the interest of the state lessens and the individual's interest in
religious freedom intensifies as intrusion on religious beliefs increases."
Since a blood transfusion is considered a minimal bodily invasion, the
burden placed on the patient cannot be considered a physical one." The
treatment sought creates a spiritual burden by infringing on the individ-
ual's religious beliefs.9 0 Clearly, it is not the court's responsibility to de-
termine the reasonableness of an individual's beliefs, but a duty exists to
carefully evaluate the gravamen of the religious objection, when balancing
it against the state's desire to preserve life.9 1 Accordingly, it has been sug-
gested that before deciding the merits of such cases, the courts should
hear testimony from an authority in the particular religion involved in
Rptr. 484, 490 (1983) (no distinction between feeding tubes and other treatments, or be-
tween ordinary and extraordinary treatments).
8 See Tune v. Walter Reed Army Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("therapy
intended merely to prolong life in the face of mortal illness"); Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 19, 355
A.2d at 652 ("prolongation of life through artificial means"); see also Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at
120, 660 P.2d at 742 (recognition of terminal patient's right to refuse medical treatment that
only prolongs dying process); Comment, The Problem of Prolonged Death: Who Should
Decide?, 27 BAYLOR L. Rav. 169, 170 (1975) (discussing moral implications involved in deci-
sion to die).
" Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 644 (blood transfusions considered minimal bodily
invasions).
87 See, e.g., Wons, 541 So. 2d at 104 (Overton, J., dissenting). "Here it was unrefuted that,
following medical treatment, Wons could return to a normal life .... Id. (Overton, J.,
dissenting).
" See Bratton, The Right to Die: A Constitutional One?, 41 JURIST 155, 170 (1981). The
test is based on the same logic as right-to-die cases founded primarily on the constitutional
right to privacy, however, it becomes necessary to modify the test when confronted with
issues of religious freedom. Id.
9 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
00 See, e.g., Wons, 541 So. 2d at 100 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring). The cost in this case was
described in spiritual terms. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
91 See Note, Unauthorized Rendition, supra note 80, at 866 n.31; cf. Wons, 541 So. 2d at
100 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring) ("[a] workable solution may be devised by a consideration of
the religious interests affected by a judicial mandate").
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the litigation in order to determine the degree of the infringement. 2
The exact depth and nature of the infringement is an important con-
sideration since most religions believe that sin only manifests itself in vol-
untary acts, and involuntary acts do not imperil the soul or preclude eter-
nal salvation. 3 Apparently, there are some Jehovah's Witnesses who
believe that receiving a blood transfusion under any circumstances will
deny them everlasting life, and others who believe they are absolved from
fault if they are forced to submit.9 4 Clearly, the state has an affirmative
obligation to investigate the patient's interpretation of his own faith, be-
cause in the event the patient's conscience could be clear by being forced
to undergo the transfusion, the state's interest in preserving life becomes
undeniably compelling."
"9 See Comment, Recent Decisions, 40 NoT'r DAME LAW. 126, 131 (1964) (advocating courts
to seek advise of spiritual counselors of the afflicted at issue).
93 See id. The dutiful Jehovah's Witness is to do "everything possible within reason and
right and without injury to another" to resist the court-ordered transfusion; however, he is
not required to resist by physical violence. Letter from the Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society of New York, Inc. to the Villanova Law Review (Oct. 6, 1964) (quoted in Recent
Developments, 10 VnLL. L. REv. 140, 141 n.3 (1964)); see also Application of the President
and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1965). Justice Wright pointed out that if "the law undertook the responsibility of au-
thorizing the transfusion without her consent, no problem would be raised with respect to
her religious practice. Thus, the effect of the order was to preserve ... the life she wanted
without sacrifice of her religious beliefs." Id.
"4 See Bratton, supra note 88, at 170 n.83; see also Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1007
(patient intimated that court could force transfusion without her resistance); United States
v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 753 (D. Conn. 1965) (patient refused to accept blood transfu-
sion but stated if court forced him his conscience would be clear); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d
372, 374 (D.C. 1972) (Jehovah's Witness refused blood transfusion based on belief that he
would be deprived of everlasting life even if he involuntarily received transfusion); St.
Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (patient believed
ingestion of whole blood would deny him both resurrection and eternal salvation, regardless
of involuntary circumstances); Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d
215, 216, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1965) (critically ill patient did not object
to receiving transfusion, but also refused to consent).
95 See Comment, supra note 92, at 131.
[Ilt is suggested that before deciding the merits of such cases, the court hear testi-
mony from an authority on the particular religion involved in the litigation, and issue
the writ only if the court is reasonably convinced that involuntary submission to
medical treatment will not 'violate a cardinal religious tenet which endangers the
soul's salvation.'
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 144 A.D.2d 8, 12, 536 N.Y.S.2d 492, 495
(1989) (court should fully comprehend patient's wishes and beliefs before taking action).
Indeed, courts do recognize the importance of ascertaining the breadth of the patient's be-
lief. Id. at 15, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 496. The court must distinguish "the situation in which a
patient refuses to affirmatively consent to a certain medical treatment based on religious
beliefs, but would accept such treatment if directed by court order." Id. When this occurs
the interest in the preservation of life "may well sustain the issuance of such an order." Id.
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THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE PROTECTION OF INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES
The state's interest in protecting third parties is based on the com-
mon law doctrine of parens patriae.as It is the duty of the state to protect
those persons who, because of infancy or incompetence, are legally inca-
pable of caring for themselves.9 7 Some courts have held that the state's
interest in preserving the life of the mother outweighs the constitutional
rights of privacy and freedom of religion, regardless of whether there is a
family to continue to care for the children.98 Moreover, the possible im-
pact on these children subsequent to the death of a parent could be de-
terminative of the outcome of the balancing process." This occurred in
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 131 (N.D. I1. 1972) (incompe-
tent individual becomes ward of court); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 479, 181 A.2d 751,
759 (state, as parens patriae, has right and duty to protect child from neglect), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 890 (1962). The parens. patriae doctrine also. empowers the court to prevent the
death of an individual for the sake of a third party. See George, 239 F. Supp. at 753 (court
ordered blood transfusion to Jehovah's Witness, father of four minors); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (court ordered
necessary blood transfusion to pregnant Jehovah's Witness), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985
(1964).
. The parens patriae doctrine also enables the government to protect the interests of
mentally incompetent patients. See P. RIGA, supra note 6, at 167. When a patient has been
judged incompetent, the state may override the individual's constitutional rights and permit
the courts to authorize lifesaving medical treatment. See Nathan & Miriam Barnett Memo-
rial Hosp. Ass'n v. Young, 63 N.J. 578, 579, 311 A.2d 1, 2 (1972) (court appointed guardian
to incompetent patient to authorize amputation); In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 177,
372 A.2d 360, 370 (1977) (court appointed guardian to an elderly disoriented patient to
authorize amputation). But see Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 382, 376 N.E.2d
1232, 1236 (1978) (refusal to submit to necessary operation is not presumption of incompe-
tence); In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 625, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 632 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1966)
(refusal to authorize amputation for elderly patient unable to comprehend the gravity of
situation). See generally Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dy-
ing Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 246 (1977) (discussing legal complexities of allowing
incompetent to die).
" See, e.g., George, 239 F. Supp. at 754 (father not permitted to refuse treatment because
of four minor children); Application of Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 804, 805, 490
N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1985) (patient has societal duty to care for infants);
Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 216, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450,
451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (blood transfusion authorized on mother with six children). Indeed,
in some states, the most determinative factor in the balancing analysis is the existence of
minor children or other innocent third parties. See Mercy Hospital, supra note 6, at 522.
" See Mercy Hospital, supra note 6, at 523. The court is not only concerned about the
child's physical welfare, "but also for the quality of the child's life and the upbringing that
the child would have if the parent were to die." Id. In fact, several cases allowing refusal of
treatment qualify the decision by stressing, in dicta, that the outcome would be different if
minor children were involved. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977) (existence of minor children
would be important factor which would have critical effect on balancing process); In re Me-
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Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,100
where the court held that a parent's "right to die" by refusing to consent
to lifesaving medical treatment would not be recognized when minor chil-
dren are dependent on the adult. 101 Clarifying the Georgetown decision,
United States v. George"'2 held that the parent's right would not be rec-
ognized even though he or she was fully competent to refuse to consent to
the medical treatment deemed necessary.103 The Georgetown court rea-
soned that the state, as parens patriae, should not allow a parent to
abandon a child.104 By refusing lifesaving treatment the court stated that
a mother would be engaging in the "most ultimate [act] of voluntary
abandonment. 10 5 Since the state can generally act to safeguard a child's
welfare,10 6 it should be able to prevent this "ultimate abandonment" of a
lidio, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976) (court
upheld patient's right to refuse, but specifically stated that had there been children in-
volved, the court may authorize transfusion).
Although the Wons court repeatedly stated the children would not suffer financial
harm, it acknowledged the emotional harm which would result from the loss of their mother.
See Wons, 500 So. 2d at 688. Clearly, the state has an interest in "protecting third parties,
particularly minor children, from the emotional and financial damage which may occur as a
result of the decision of a competent adult to refuse lifesaving or life-prolonging treatment."
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at.426.
100 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
101 Id. at 1008.
'0 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
101 Id. at 754. The patient, who was married and a father of four children, was found to be
coherent and rational when he refused lifesaving treatment. Id. The court still ordered the
blood transfusion, reasoning that the variance in the patient's "rational capacity" did not
compel a dissimilar result than that reached in Georgetown. Id.; see also supra, note 98 and
accompanying text (great need for state protection of incompetent).
1' See Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008. See generally Oakes v. Oakes, 45 Ill. App. 2d 387,
342, 195 N.E.2d 840, 844 (1964) (court recognized "the fundamental interest of the state in
the welfare of its minor citizens"); Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 622, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773
(government has responsibility as parens patriae to care for infants within its jurisdiction
and to protect them from neglect, abuse, and fraud), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952). See
generally BLACK'S LAw DxCTIONAY 1003 (5th ed. 1979) (" '[plarens patriae,' literally 'parent
of the country,' refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons
under legal disability. It is a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign
interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people.. .") (citation omitted).
106 See Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008.
100 See, e.g., State v. Sandford, 99 Me. 441, 445, 59 A. 97, 100 (1905) (same); Palmer v.
State, 223 Md. 341, 351-52, 164 A.2d 467, 473 (1960) (court interfered when parent aban-
doned child). For cases on abandonment of a child, see In re Kelley v. State, 218 Miss. 459,
465, 67 So. 2d 459, 462 (1953) (abandonment occurs when parent "'quits the society of his
children and renounces the duties he owes them as a father' "); Jeremy "GG", 84 A.D.2d
864, 865, 444 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (3d Dep't 1981) (abandonment occurred when father
evinced intent to forego his parental rights and obligations by not visiting or communicating
with child during first six months of child's life even though able to do so). See generally 28
AM. JR. 2D, Desertion and Nonsupport § 52 (1983). A parent abandons a child by actually
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child. 107 While the use of the parens patriae doctrine to justify this inter-
vention has been questioned,' the state still clearly maintains an inter-
est in protecting minor children according to the balancing test.'0 s It is
submitted that the weight given this important state interest should be,
largely or in part, based upon the degree of harm to be inflicted on the
minor child. For example, it is submitted that the Wons court failed to
distinguish this degree and oversimplified the matter by stating that in all
situations the nurturing and support of a child by two parents is not suffi-
cient to override fundamental constitutional rights. Alternatively, Fos-
mire gave much more discretion to courts by allowing a case-by-case
analysis." 0
The harm to be inflicted on a child when the child's parent refuses
lifesaving treatment is two-fold. First, there is an economic harm and sec-
ond, there is an emotional harm."' The Wons and Fosmire courts found
that there would be no economic harm since the fathers Were still living
and would provide for the children." 2 Going one step further, the Wons
court decided that the state's interest in the emotional well-being of a
minor child would never override a competent patient's right to refuse
treatment."' Contrary to this reasoning, it has been asserted that the
physically leaving the child with an intent to sever the parental relation entirely, so far as it
is possible to do so. Id.
101 See Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008. The court likened the refusing of lifesaving treatment
to the foregoing of parental duties. Id.
'" See Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Reevaluated, 51 MINN.
L. Rzv. 293, 298-01 (1966). While the state's interest of having the parent care for his or her
child is sufficient to order lifesaving medical treatment, the application of the parens pa-
triae doctrine was incorrect. Id. at 301. "The purpose of parens patriae is to provide a vehi-
cle for the court to physically protect the child and not to protect a parent so he can in turn
provide for his child." Id. The parens patriae doctrine is generally used in situations where
the child is in physical danger. See State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 469, 181 A.2d 751, 759
(court appointed guardian to accept blood transfusion for child whose parents refused based
on religious grounds), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812,
815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (state's interest in welfare of its citizens allows it to take custody
of children where parents abandon them or parents prove otherwise unsuitable).
'09 See Sati v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d
359 (1980). The test only mentions the state's interest in protection of third parties. Id. It
seems to suggest that since the test never mentions the state's power as parens patriae,
there is no need for courts to discuss the doctrine.
110 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
" See Won.s, 541 So. 2d at 97; Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 732, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). See generally Cantor, supra note 97, at 251
(child benefits emotionally by continued love and reassurance from parent and economically
by continued financial support).
"' See Wons, 500 So. 2d at 686; Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 144 A.D.2d 8, 16, 536 N.Y.S.2d 492,
497 (2d Dep't 1989), afrd, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990).
"' See Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97. "While we agree that the nurturing and support by two
parents is important in the development of any child, it is not sufficient to override funda-
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state does have a legitimate interest in a child's emotional well-being
which can be sustained on two grounds.11 Firstly, there is an unselfish
concern to provide each child with a healthful environment. 15 Secondly,
there is a concern in preserving this environment so that children will
develop into rational adults and thus promote the political and social wel-
fare of society."' In reasoning contrary to the majority of courts, it is
submitted that this interest, when combined with the other state inter-
ests, might override an individual's right to refuse lifesaving treatment
depending upon the degree of harm, emotional as well as economic, to be
sustained by the child.
DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT OF THE BALANCING ANALYSIS
Courts have stressed that minor children would not be abandoned if
the surviving family was able to support them.' It has been suggested by
some commentators that adherence to such reasoning would result in dis-
crimination between men and women. Although the percentage has de-
creased, the primary provider for most families remains the male head of
household.1 ' It is submitted that decisions such as the one reached in
Wons set a precedent which would cause a father to be restricted from
refusing medical treatment because his surviving spouse would be unable
to support the children. 19 On the other hand, a mother who renders no
financial support would be permitted to refuse treatment because the
children would have the benefit of the father's financial support in the
event of the mother's demise. 120 Similarly, this Note suggests that compli-
mental constitutional rights." Id. The Fosmire court did not address how much weight it
would give to the emotional well-being of a minor child. See Fosmire, 144 A.D.2d at 15-16,
536 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97.
114 See Cantor, supra note 97, at 251. There is an altruistic concern and also a concern in
the development of the child. Id.
11 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). The state can limit the powers of the
parent where "it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child, or have a potential for significant social burdens." Id.
116 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("[a] democratic society rests, for
its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens"); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Mo. App. 1952) (youth of society consti-
tute hope of racial survival and progress, and are of vital concern to very life of the nation).
17 See Wons, 541 So. 2d at 98; Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 144 A.D.2d 8, 15-16, 536 N.Y.S.2d 492,
496-97 (2d Dep't 1989), aff'd, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551, N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990).
118 See L. KAowrrz, Sax ROLES IN LAW AND SocmErY 299-01 (1973). Presently, approxi-
mately 90% of families in our society are supported by the male parent. Id. at 299.
11 See Cantor, supra note 97, at 254 (father would be denied opportunity to honor his
convictions because of insufficient finances).
"0 See St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The
patient was permitted to refuse blood transfusions; however, the court reached its decision
only after determining that the patient's minor child lived with his former wife in another
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ance with such reasoning would discriminate between the wealthy and the
impoverished. 121 It is submitted that an individual's right to refuse treat-
ment will increase proportionally with his wealth, since his child will less
likely become a ward of the state. Obviously, this results in unequal pro-
tection of the law, which clearly violates public policy. 122
THE BALANCING PROCESS
When faced with the question of when an individual can refuse life-
saving treatment, courts must determine which constitutional rights are
implicated, and which individual rights specifically warrant protection.'2 s
Strangely, the state concerns cited on the other side of the equation are
sometimes analogized to the interests either of suppression 1 4 or censor-
ship.'25 Often, it seems, courts make this analogy, and subsequently the
interests of society receive less weight. 2 6 When such a conflict arises
there should be reasonable accommodations, whenever possible, to pre-
state. Id. Additionally, the patient had a small annuity, of which the minor child was benefi-
ciary. Id. Similarly, in Wons, the court immediately determined that Mr. Wons provided the
"sole financial support for his family." See Wons,. 500 So. 2d at 681; see also In re Osborne,
294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972) (where patient is responsible for support of minor children, he
may refuse treatment if it can be shown they will be adequately cared for).
121 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
"' See Note, Unauthorized Rendition, supra note 80, at 861. It has been asserted that if
treatment can be ordered for some persons because of their particular circumstances, for
example, responsibility to their children, it must be ordered for all. Id.
123 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
'See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text; see also Note, The Right to Die: A Com-
ment on the Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 9 UTAH L.
REv. 161, 163-68 (1964). The right to transfer belief into action is subject to reasonable
regulation to insure public health, safety, and morals. Id. Thus, it has been held that despite
individual religious beliefs to the contrary, the state can mandate certain requirements. See,
e.g., Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942, 946 (1949) (prohibiting handling of poisonous
snakes); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (requiring medical treatment
of children); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (requiring all persons to be vaccinated);
Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 621, 277 P.2d 352, 355 (1954) (adding fluoride to
public drinking water).
135 The "clear and present danger" test evolved in cases involving freedom of speech under
the first amendment. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). It is submitted that the test used to censor a person's speech should be more
strict than any test employed in a religious context. See Note, Court Authorization of Blood
Transfusion to Patient Whose Religious Beliefs Prohibits the Acceptance of Blood Violates
His Freedom of Religion-In re Estate of Brooks, 44 TEx. L. Rav. 190, 194-95 (1965); see
also Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment, supra note 80, at 403-04. When balancing indi-
vidual religious interests, "[t]he problem is seen as a battle between the existence of reli-
gious freedom and the intermeddling of society." Id.
126 See Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment, supra note 80, at 404. "There is a general
failure to balance the conflicting interests involved, and as a result the interests of society
are, as a matter of course, accorded a lesser weight." Id.
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serve the essentials of both sides.127 Accordingly, courts have a duty of
giving proper weight to "considerations of social advantage." 128 When
they fail to accomplish this, judgments consequently lack expression and
guidance.129 It is submitted that most decisions in this area fail to satisfy
this duty of allocating proper importance to social interests but rather
dogmatically uphold a person's right to refuse lifesaving treatment.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, the question of whether an individual may refuse a blood
transfusion is legally and morally complex. This is especially true where
the individual asserting the right is young, and death would be viewed as
particularly tragic and wasteful. This is precisely why it is essential for
courts to inquire extensively into the particular situation and not over-
simplify the balancing process. It is suggested that the majority of courts
have ignored factors that could be determinative in the outcome of
whether an individual should live or die. Therefore, many courts have
failed to afford protection to minor children and, most importantly, have
seriously denigrated the sanctity of human life.
Geraldine Koeneke Russell & Donald Wallace
127 See Antieau, The Limitation of Religious Liberty, 18 FORDHAM L. Rav. 221, 224 (1949).
Courts should determine'when there can be a reasonable accommodation between govern-
mental interests and constitutional rights. Id.
I1 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rav. 457, 467 (1897). "I think that the
judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations
of social advantage." Id.
129 Id. When judges fail to take into consideration society's interests the result is "simply to
leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious." Id.

